This study analyzes the long-term reasons why Udmurt occupies a restricted linguistic space in the postSoviet state -the low status of Udmurt, due to Soviet language and other policies; urbanization; population shifts; myths and stereotypes about Udmurts; making Russian compulsory after 1938 -and the consequences of this for the fate of the Udmurt language today (relatively few native speakers). The central argument is that Udmurts have not overcome the Stalinist legacy, which led to the reversal of Lenin's 'affirmative action' policy on non-Russian languages. This stems from the failure of the elites in the Udmurt Republic to pursue an ethnic mobilization strategy to promote the Udmurt language in contemporary Russia. Drawing upon language planning and ethnic policy elsewhere in Russia (Tatarstan) and in the UK (Wales), this article outlines ways to raise the status of Udmurt without generating interethnic conflict, thereby creating a 'space for all'.
Introduction
This article presents a case study of Udmurtia, a small Finno-Ugric republic of the Russian Federation with a population of approximately 1.7 million, consisting of 60.1% Russian, 29.3% Our INTAS research shows that, although language is an ethnic marker in the Udmurt Republic and language and national identity are linked, Udmurts tend not to stand up for their own language. Nevertheless ethnic conflict in the Udmurt Republic is minimal. 3 This may be partly because some schools in the republic (such as school No. 97 in Izhevsk) are successfully run on the principle of 'learning to live together', i.e. promoting tolerance and co-operation between different nationalities within the Republic. 4 Despite this, discrimination against
Udmurts still takes place. Our 2006-7 INTAS survey found that 8% of Udmurts suffered discrimination at work and 12.3% at school, while 12.3% were insulted/humiliated while travelling on public transport and 23.9% in other places (in the street, shops or hospitals, for example). 5 Our INTAS project findings show that 'framing' occurs, by which we mean that Udmurt identity is constructed by others (Russians), and this leads to low levels of self-esteem and to myths about and the stereotyping of Udmurts -as obedient 6 -with a failure to stress other positive qualities, for example, kindness, hospitability, tolerance of others, a propensity for hard work, strong ties to birthplace and community and so on. Furthermore, there seems to be a widespread false perception of urbanites (largely Russian) as 'well-educated' and 'skilled' and of rural inhabitants (many Udmurts) as 'backward'. Unfortunately, some sections of the Udmurt population seem to have accepted their supposedly inferior status and by so doing, indirectly confirmed the established social and cultural order in the Republic, which might also explain the lack of ethnic tension between Udmurts and others (Russians, Tatars and so on) and the reluctance of Udmurts to fight for their language and Udmurtian ethnic revival. 7 Mastyugina and 6 The reasons for the low status of the Udmurt language
The historical analysis offered here demonstrates that the Stalinist legacy and the reversal of earlier Leninist 'affirmative action' nationalities and language policy are the main factors in Udmurt's low status. However, a number of other factors -demography, Udmurt psychology and assimilation -are also important, and we shall discuss each factor in turn.
Language policy from Lenin to Putin: The reversal of 'affirmative action' for Udmurt
The nature and evolution of Soviet language policy, which was constructed by mostly urban, Russian-speaking Bolsheviks, is the main explanation. Much of the Soviet population was illiterate and half the population was non-Russian after 1917. There was also a massive gap between the centre (Moscow) and the periphery (Udmurtia), with a general belief -which to some extent still exists today -that cities were civilized and the villages backward. Despite the initial difficulties following the October 1917 revolution and Russian civil war , Lenin was in favour of giving all languages equal status as a means of undermining the class basis of nationalism, and he attempted to preserve and foster the culture of different nationalities via literacy campaigns, the promotion of traditional costumes and cultures, and the elevation of national elites into the party, government, different sectors of the economy and the education system (Kreindler 1979: 3) . This move was part of Lenin's strategy of seeking to legitimize Soviet power through the promotion of Udmurt language, culture and elites. This was achieved during the New Economic Policy period ) through a policy of 'affirmative action' designed to enhance the position of non-Russians, such as Udmurts, by promotion (vydvizhenie) into leading positions (Kulikova 2005, chapter 2; Martin 2001 ). This korenizatsiia (nativization or indigenization) policy led to Udmurtia being run by Udmurt elites able to speak their own national language. In the 1920s, Moscow also sponsored "symbolic markers of national identity" (Martin 2001: 13) , such as national folklore, museums, press, food, costumes, opera, poetry, literature and so on. (Aspects of this tradition still survive to this day in standing exhibits on Udmurt costumes and traditions at the Arsenal Museum in the capital Izhevsk, and in the nearby Ludervai architectural and ethnographic museum).
This 'affirmative action' policy led to the rise of Udmurt intellectual elites (Vasileva 1999) and Udmurt-language national schools under the jurisdiction of Narkompros. 8 Other major developments followed, including the development of literary Udmurt 9 and a major nativelanguage publishing programme. Thus by 1929, Soviet school textbooks were published in 56 languages, including Udmurt (Kreindler 1979: 4) . The overall aim of these strategies was to eradicate illiteracy, economic and cultural inequality, and to reduce nationalism. In relation to the first goal, this 'affirmative action' strategy succeeded, as literacy levels increased from 28.4% in 1897 to 56.6% by 1926 56.6% by (Comrie 1981 . But the Soviet state was less successful in relation to the other goals. Comrie points out that Russian was used in the education system, required for military service, vital for one's career and strongly prevalent in urban areas (Comrie 1981: 32-36) . As a result, Russian effectively became the first among equals from the 1930s onwards.
Furthermore, Kreindler shows that this 'affirmative action' policy assumed that it was the Russians who were supposed to be bilingual in a non-Russian area (Kreindler 1979: 3).
However, the reverse actually happened from the 1930s onwards. Thus Udmurts increasingly became bilingual and this has remained the case today. The Soviet state might have dressed this process up in socialist rhetoric, arguing that 'affirmative action' policy was a sign of Moscow's commitment to minority rights and identities, but it was still cynically manipulating Udmurts for its own ends up to the late 1920s, by only giving the Udmurts superficial forms of nationhood.
As the political situation changed in the Stalin era, however, some Udmurt figures, including the legendary Kuzebai Gerd, were falsely accused of using Udmurt as a means of nationalist expression and Gerd, alongside many Udmurts, was subsequently arrested and died in Stalin's Great Terror of the mid-to-late 1930s. This hindered the development of the indigenous Udmurt intelligentsia, Udmurt language, literature, culture and society -and, of course, the participation of Udmurts in the Soviet economic and political system under Stalin. 10 Shkliaev and Toulouze point out that this imposition of limits on the degree of 'Udmurtization' has left a lasting mark on both the Udmurts and the Russians (in the Udmurt Republic) well into the late and post-Soviet phase:
This episode and others like it have left a very deep wound in the conscience of the non-Russian population: fear has characterised their approach to ethnic issues, not only in terms of a concrete fear of punishment, but also simply in the feeling that such questions were dangerous and even taboo. (Shkliaev and Toulouze 2001: 99) Shkliaev and Toulouze also believe that senior political figures and ethnic Udmurts in high society still actively opposed Gerd's rehabilitation (as a powerful symbol of Udmurt national identity) in the late 1980s and into the 1990s, when ethnic mobilization was widespread in Russia. It seems that the Stalinist legacy is preventing an open and objective discussion of the national question in contemporary Udmurtia (Shkliaev and Toulouze 2001: 99-100 ).
As we shall see below, Stalin and post-Stalin nationality and language policies allowed the reemergence of Imperial (in its USSR or Soviet Empire variety) Russian nationalism, which in turn led to the demise of nativization/indigenization and the gradual criticism of pro-Udmurt policies after Lenin's death. This might be best characterized as 'affirmative exclusion'. 11 As a result, Russian eventually became the language of administration, the army, state and social institutions, with campaigns to promote Russian starting as early as 1925, only two years after korenizatsiia was introduced. Not surprisingly, non-Russians were slow to master the Udmurt language.
Furthermore in some schools, Russian teachers refused to teach native languages, which Smith attributes to disrespect, chauvinism, ethnic prejudice and possible racism (Smith 1998: 57) .
Under the influence of N. Ia. Marr, who rejected the notion of a plurality of languages and pushed for one language in the USSR (see Slezkine 1996: 826-862 still some difficulties teaching Russian in non-Russian schools due to poorly-trained teachers, a
shortage of textbooks and so on (Smith 1998: 139 (Kreindler 1979: 7) . This new law, which was implemented in September 1938, meant that "[Udmurt] students were required to enter secondary school with basic reading, speaking and writing skills in Russian to carry out a conversation and conduct work in an office setting" (Smith 1998: 159) .
Growing Russification led to codification (the production of descriptive grammars, dictionaries, rules for spelling and pronunciation, alphabets and so on), which in turn gradually paved the way for standardization of dialect(s) and the setting of norms of usage (Blitstein 2001: 262-263) . This trend impacted upon Udmurt-language modernization, corpus and status planning. The influx of Russian words and grammatical constructions into Udmurt and Russian borrowing now took place. Such a situation made it extremely difficult for Udmurts to opt for their native language, as it was lower in prestige and status and poorer in corpus, but more importantly Russian was now increasingly used in government, industry, commerce, defence and so on.
During the Great Patriotic War, money and textbook shortages were compounded by the drafting of teachers for military service, leading to a decline in teaching quality and knowledge of Russian (Blitstein 2001: 264-265) . As a consequence, Smith points out, "Udmurt children were unable to speak communicable Russian because they spoke their native tongue at home, while Russian language teaching methods were 'primitive' and their teachers illiterate in Russian" (Smith 1998: 166) . These failures led to the reorganization of Russian-language teaching in schools, changes in methodology 12 and to an increase in the number of hours of
Russian from ten to seventeen hours per week. Smith concludes that by the end of the Stalin era (1953), "new generations of non-Russians became bilingual, mixing and matching their native and adopted Russian tongues at will, depending on the moment and desired meaning" (Smith 1998 : 177).
Khrushchev's 1958 Educational Reform completed the reversal of Leninist 'affirmative action' language and nationality policy, as parents now had the opportunity to send their children to Russian-language schools (Kreindler 1979: 27-31) . From 1958 onwards, there was a decline in national languages and an expansion in Russian teaching (Kreindler 1979: 24) . This situation gradually led to fewer resources for non-Russian languages and a growing emphasis on Russian, leading in turn to increasing bilingualism among non-Russians. Thus, in the period 1970-1989, two-thirds of Udmurts declared that they were fluent in Russian (Grenoble 2003: 195) .
This non-affirmative action policy was implemented in the education system, the press, radio and television. In the process, the number of Udmurt-language books and other publications and the number of hours broadcast each week in Udmurt were closely monitored and controlled. Our recent interviews with government officials and journalists in the Udmurt Republic show the long-term impact of Soviet neglect, namely a shortage of children's literature in Udmurt. Staff from the children's newspaper Zechbur informed us that it had a weekly circulation of 2,000. All schools received it, but most subscribers were rural. Although they acknowledged the value of government support, there was still not enough money to send copies of Zechbur to libraries in the Udmurt Republic. Udmurt journalists also emphasized that many young people in Udmurtia had no interest in their mother tongue (Udmurt) and identify instead with Russian, with Udmurt being largely used at home. 13 Regarding Udmurt books, staff at the "Udmurtia" publishing house declared that 40-70 books were published annually, with a print-run ranging from 500 to 5,000, depending upon the topic. Only 30% of these books were in the Udmurt language. These books were published via sponsorship from the Ministries of Education and Nationalities in Udmurtia.
Whilst this indicates a degree of government support, a chief editor at the "Udmurtia" publishing house added that, due to financial constraints, there was still a great shortage of works in 
Udmurt assimilation
Finally, there is, of course, the political factor, namely the ever-increasing promotion of Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication within the USSR in general and the Udmurt Republic in particular. A major aim of Soviet language policy was assimilation, and this was partly achieved by the changing emphasis on drawing together (sblizhenie) and to merging (sliianie) nations, which led to a change of ethnic identity, in this case from Udmurt to Russian.
In some instances, this resulted in a shift in language use ('linguistic assimilation'), as well as a change in language identity ('linguistic re-identification') (Gorenburg 2006: 279) . This was a consequence of urbanization, greater exposure to Russian language and culture, especially in the towns, a reduction in native-language education and the relatively higher prestige of Russian and low status of Udmurt. This changing pattern of ethnic identity demonstrates how successful the Soviet state was in assimilating part of the non-Russian population, in this case in Udmurtia.
This relates to the key issue of the degree of institutional support, which has varied over time.
Vasileva's research on the role of national schools highlights the importance of education for the emergence of an Udmurt national identity and preserving the language. 19 In the post-Soviet era, a new law on national languages in the Udmurt Republic (2001) To reverse language shift and revitalize the Udmurt language, and above all to create a full linguistic space for it in present-day Russia, the following steps need to be taken. The Udmurt government needs to take a lead by promoting the value of the Udmurt language via the recruitment of Udmurt speakers into local and republican government posts and by more Udmurt speakers becoming MPs, thereby promoting Udmurt in public life. This involves using a 1920s style 'affirmative action' policy. It is absolutely vital that Udmurt language policy is driven and supported at a senior level in the Udmurt Republic itself, as well as at a federal level in the Russian Federation. The Udmurt government also needs to provide the necessary finance and other support to introduce at least dual-language signs (Udmurt and Russian) throughout Udmurtia, in order to keep the language visible. There is a need to stress the importance of Udmurt in kindergarten, primary and secondary schools by making Udmurt a core subject in the National Curriculum for all schoolchildren, or at least as a foundation subject in Russian-medium schools. In line with this, it is essential that there are sufficient Udmurt-speaking teachers trained to work in kindergarten, primary and secondary schools and universities, thereby promoting the number of people able to speak, read and write the Udmurt language from the earliest age and then throughout the education system. An Udmurt Books Council should be created to promote the publication of books of different genres in the Udmurt language, as well as Udmurt book sales-outlets, possibly with private sector support, to combat the low status of the Udmurt language. There should be an increase in the number of hours of Udmurt-language programming on radio and TV and an improvement in its quality and timing so that it meets the needs of Udmurt-speaking listeners and viewers of all ages. This will help save the Udmurt language from the ghetto of folk culture. As Udmurt language use is highest in the villages, the government needs to ensure that rural schools, heads and teachers have adequate resources to maintain the Udmurt language, culture and traditions. The production, marketing and selling of music and computer games in the Udmurt language is essential to promote Udmurt amongst youth. In this respect, Shirobokova (2011: 313) sees the Internet as crucial to revitalizing the Udmurt language.
The Udmurt government must provide the qualified staff necessary to mark university-entrance exams in Udmurt, so that those who have been educated in Udmurt are not discriminated against when going to university. The Ministries of Education and Nationalities in Udmurtia must maintain and expand national schools promoting the Udmurt language. In this regard, Udmurt language plans should be developed in line with levels of language use in the communities served, but must also seek to increase use of Udmurt beyond a village setting. It is particularly important that the government in Udmurtia investigate parental attitudes towards Udmurt language learning, and if negative views prevail, then policies need developing to overcome these obstacles. For Udmurt to have higher esteem and status it needs role models, so the Udmurt government and the relevant Ministries must take steps to prevent the Udmurt brain drain and the loss of talented Udmurts from the Republic. The Udmurt government must work with IT leaders, such as Microsoft, to develop Microsoft Office and XP packages in the Udmurt language, as well as with mobile-phone providers (Beeline, Tele 2 and so on) to provide services and phones with an Udmurt-language capability. Apart from the state, small, medium and large-sized enterprises must also start to meet the needs of their Udmurt-speaking consumers, workers and employersthese companies must learn to operate bilingually in terms of signs, communication, store layout, bills, customer relations and staff. Finally, the relevant government ministries in Udmurtia must undertake regular Udmurt-language audits and collect and analyze data on the Udmurt language -its condition, status, use in different situations (at home, with friends or neighbours, whilst shopping or travelling on a bus, whilst working in the public or the private sector and so on), so that we know who the Udmurt speakers are, in terms of their age, gender and occupation, and where they live (city, village, region). Better long-term planning in relation to the Udmurt language is required to identify issues and resolve them.
Conclusion
Of course, none of the above strategies will work or be implemented unless there is the political will at federal and republican level, or unless Udmurts start to campaign for their own language and culture. As argued above, the Stalinist legacy has played a major part in undermining Lenin's original 'affirmative action' strategy and the failure to reverse this situation since the 1930s has meant that Udmurt culture is invisible in the cities of the Udmurt Republic today.
Even the capital, Izhevsk, remains in 2011 a Russian centre, not an Udmurt cultural space. The
Udmurt President and his government advisors have a key role to play in reversing this situation.
These actors should follow the positive example set in Tatarstan, where Tatar language has higher visibility and ethnic conflict with Russians is low (C. Williams 2011).
